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Abstract
We fully characterize best-response functions in Colonel Blotto games with lot-
tery contest success functions.
Keywords: Multi-Battle contest, Colonel Blotto game, Contest success
function, Best-response, Conflict.
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1. Introduction
Friedman [2] derives the unique equilibrium of a two-player Colonel Blotto
game with a lottery success function [4] in each battlefield. He also offers a
characterization of a player’s best-response function in the game. However, for
some values of the primitives, his proposed characterization results in infeasible
negative allocations to battlefields.
This article completely characterizes a player’s best response function in the
game, thereby correcting Friedman. This facilitates the analysis of Stackelberg
models of attack and defense, where a complete account of subgame behavior is
required for equilibrium analysis. It also aids in behavioral analyses of Blotto
games, where systematic deviations from optimal behavior are analyzed.1
⋆Corresponding authors: Dan Kovenock: kovenock@chapman.edu; David Rojo Arjona:
rojoarjo@chapman.edu.
1See, for example, [1].
2. Model
Suppose two players, i = 1, 2, are endowed with budgets, Xi ∈ R++. The
two players simultaneously divide their respective budgets into (sunk) alloca-
tions across n ≥ 2 independent battlefields. The finite set of battlefields is de-
noted by B and player i’s value of winning battlefield j ∈ B is vij ∈ R++. Any
allocation to battlefield j by player i needs to be non-negative, xij ∈ R+. Player
i’s pure strategy space is the set of non-negative n-tuples xi = (xi1, xi2, ..., xin)
satisfying ∑nj=1 xij ≤ Xi, i = 1, 2.
Each player’s objective function is given by Πi =
∑n
j=1 pijvij where pij is
the probability of player i winning battlefield j, determined by a lottery contest
success function:
pij(xij , x−ij) =

xij
(xij+x−ij)
if xij + x−ij ̸= 0
1
2 if xij = x−ij = 0
2.1. The Maximization Problem and Kuhn-Tucker Conditions
Suppose player −i selects an allocation x−i ≫ 0. In this case, pij and Πi
are continuous in xij ∀j.2 Then, the constrained optimization problem faced
2There are two other cases. One alternative case involves x−ij such that x−ij > 0 ∀j ∈
C−i ̸= ∅ and x−ij = 0 ∀j ∈ B \C−i ̸= ∅. In this case, pijvij is continuous in xij for j ∈ C−i.
For j ∈ B \ C−i, pij (and the associated pijvij) is discontinuous at xij = 0, taking the value
1
2
at xij = 0 and 1 for all xij > 0. Because pijvij is strictly increasing in xij for j ∈ C−i and
there is no smallest xij strictly greater than 0 for j ∈ B \ C−i, there is no best response to
x−i. The final case involves x−i such that x−ij = 0 ∀j. In this case, any feasible allocation
xi such that xij > 0 ∀j is a best response.
2
by player i can be expressed as
maximize
xi
n∑
j=1
xij
xij + x−ij
vij
subject to
n∑
j=1
xij ≤ Xi (budget constraint),
xij ≥ 0 ∀j (non-negativity constraint).
The corresponding Lagrangian is
L =
n∑
j=1
xij
xij + x−ij
vij + µ0
Xi − n∑
j=1
xij
+ n∑
j=1
µjxij .
Taking the derivative with respect to xij and equating it to 0,
∂L
∂xij
=
x−ijvij
(xij + x−ij)
2 − µ0 + µj = 0 ∀j. (1)
In addition, we have n+1 dual feasibility conditions (see expression (2)) and
n+ 1 complementary slackness conditions (see expressions (3) and (4)):
µ0, µj ≥ 0 ∀j, (2)
µ0
Xi − n∑
j=1
xij
 = 0, (3)
µjxij = 0 ∀j. (4)
3. Best-Response Functions
Without loss of generality, we assume that battlefields are ordered such that
vi1
x−i1
≥ vi2
x−i2
≥ ... ≥ vin
x−in
. (5)
Define
k∗ = max{k ∈ B : vij
x−ij
>
(∑j
l=1 (x−ilvil)
1
2
)2
(
Xi +
∑j
l=1 x−il
)2 ∀j ≤ k}. (6)
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Note that the bracketed inequality holds if and only if
(
vij
x−ij
)(
Xi +
j∑
l=1
x−il
)2
>
(
j∑
l=1
(x−ilvil)
1
2
)2
⇔
(
vij
x−ij
) 1
2
(
Xi +
j∑
l=1
x−il
)
>
j∑
l=1
x−il
(
vil
x−il
) 1
2
⇔
(
vij
x−ij
) 1
2
Xi >
j∑
l=1
x−il
[(
vil
x−il
) 1
2
−
(
vij
x−ij
) 1
2
]
(7)
Note first that (5) implies that the left hand side (LHS) of condition (7)
is non-increasing in j and strictly decreasing from j to j + 1 if and only if
vij
x−ij
>
vi(j+1)
x−i(j+1)
. Moreover, the right hand side (RHS) is non-decreasing in j and
is strictly increasing from j to j + 1 if and only if vijx−ij >
vi(j+1)
x−i(j+1)
.
One consequence is that if visx−is =
vij
x−ij
for s ̸= j, then, the inequality holds
for j if and only if it holds for s.
Clearly, for j = 1, the inequality in condition (6) reduces to vilx−i1 >
x−i1vi1
(Xi+x−i1)2
,
which clearly holds because for Xi > 0, (Xi + x−i1)2 > x2−i1.
As a consequence, there is a unique set K = {1, ..., k∗} such that ∀j ∈
{1, ..., k∗} the inequality in condition (6) holds and ∀j > k∗ the inequality does
not hold.
We now claim.
Proposition 1 (Best Response Function). For given primitives (Xi and vij , j =
1, ..., n) and a given allocation of the other player x−i ≫ 0, the unique optimal
allocation of player i, xi = (xi1, ..., xin), to battlefields b ∈ B is characterized as
follows:
xib =

(x−ibvib)
1
2∑
j∈K(x−ijvij)
1
2
(
Xi +
∑
j∈K x−ij
)
− x−ib if b ∈ K
0 if b ∈ B \K
(8)
whereK = {1, ..., k∗} is such that k∗ = max{k ∈ B : vijx−ij >
(∑j
l=1(x−ilvil)
1
2
)2
(Xi+
∑j
l=1 x−il)
2 ∀j ≤
k}
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Note that the corresponding expression for xib when b ∈ K will be strictly
positive if
vib
x−ib
>
(∑
j∈K (x−ijvij)
1
2
)2
(
Xi +
∑
j∈K x−ij
)2 . (9)
Since (9) holds by definition for b = k∗, (5) implies that all battlefields b ∈ K
receive a strictly positive allocation.
Proof. The maximization problem in section 2.1 satisfies the linearity constraint
qualifications and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary. In addition, the
conditions for sufficiency also hold: concavity of the value function and inequal-
ities described by continuously differentiable convex functions. Consequently,
there is a unique global constrained maximizer (see, for example, Theorem
M.K.4 in [3]).
In what follows, we verify that the candidate solution of Proposition 1 satis-
fies the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, which are necessary and sufficient and conclude
that the candidate solution must be the unique global constrained maximizer of
the problem. Proposition 1 suggests an optimizer in which positive allocations
xip > 0 are assigned to battlefields p ∈ K and a zero allocation, xiz = 0, to
battlefields z ∈ B \K.
To verify the claim for the first case, note that, for a positive allocation, the
complementary slackness condition (4) requires µp = 0 ∀p ∈ K. Therefore,
condition (1) for battlefields p ∈ K is reduced to:
x−ipvip
(xip + x−ip)
2 = µ0 ∀p ∈ K. (10)
Note that µ0 > 0 and µp = 0 satisfy the dual feasibility conditions (2).
Rearranging and taking the square root,
xip + x−ip =
(
x−ipvip
µ0
) 1
2
∀p ∈ K.
Summing both sides over the elements j ∈ K,
∑
j∈K
xij +
∑
j∈K
x−ij =
∑
j∈K (x−ijvij)
1
2
µ0
1
2
.
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Given that µ0 > 0, the complementary slackness condition (3) implies Xi −∑n
j=1 xij = 0. Because (8) implies that xip > 0 if and only if p ∈ K, it follows
that ∑j∈K xij = Xi. Therefore,
Xi +
∑
j∈K
x−ij =
∑
j∈K (x−ijvij)
1
2
µ0
1
2
.
Solving for µ0,
µ0 =
(∑
j∈K (x−ijvij)
1
2
)2
(
Xi +
∑
j∈K x−ij
)2 . (11)
Substituting from (10) for µ0 in (11) and rearranging,
xip =
(x−ipvip)
1
2∑
j∈K (x−ijvij)
1
2
Xi +∑
j∈K
x−ij
− x−ip. (12)
Thus, we have confirmed that the necessary and sufficient conditions hold
for the specification of xib, b ∈ K, in Proposition 1. To verify the claim for
z ∈ B \K, note that, when xiz = 0 for z ∈ B \K, (1) reduces to
viz
x−iz
= µ0 − µz ∀z ∈ B \K. (13)
Substituting the RHS of expression (11) for µ0 in expression (13) and solving
for µz,
µz =
(∑
j∈K (x−ijvij)
1
2
)2
(
Xi +
∑
j∈K x−ij
)2 − vizx−iz ∀z ∈ B \K.
The dual feasibility condition (2) µz ≥ 0 holds for z ∈ B \K if and only if
the RHS of the expression above is non-negative.
Rearranging,
viz
x−iz
≤
(∑
j∈K (x−ijvij)
1
2
)2
(
Xi +
∑
j∈K x−ij
)2 ∀z ∈ B \K. (14)
Note that the remaining complementary slackness condition (4) is trivially
satisfied. Condition (14) and the condition defining elements of K in (6) are
mutually exclusive and exhaust all possible cases. Thus, our proposed charac-
terization of xib is the unique solution.
6
4. Revisiting Friedman’s Best-Response Function
In a version where vij = v−ij , Friedman [2] provides the following charac-
terization for the best response function (see equation (12) of [2]).
xij =
(x−ijvij)
1
2∑n
j=1 (x−ijvij)
1
2
(Xi +X−i)− x−ij (15)
This proposed expression coincides with expression (12) when player −i
exhausts his budget and when K = B. However, K = B is not generally true.
Thus, Friedman’s expression can result in negative allocations under certain
combinations of admissible primitives. For example, when n = 2, v11 = v12 = 1,
X1 = 5, X2 = 50, x21 = 10 and x22 = 40, his proposed expression results in
x12 = − 103 < 0. This is not feasible.
Proposition 1 puts this problem into perspective. A negative allocation
to battlefield 2 in Friedman’s proposed solution implies that condition (14) is
satisfied with strict inequality. Thus, battlefield 2 /∈ K. Consequently, x12 = 0.
Given the primitives of the example and x2 = (10, 40), it can be easily verified
that, according to Proposition 1, the optimal allocations to battlefields 1 ∈ K
and 2 /∈ K are x11 = X1 = 5 and x12 = 0, respectively.
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